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Abstract
We study optimal bidding strategies for advertisers in sponsored search auctions. In general, these auctions are
run as variants of second-price auctions but have been shown to be incentive incompatible. Thus, advertisers
have to be strategic about bidding. Uncertainty in the decision-making environment, budget constraints, and
the presence of a large portfolio of keywords makes the bid optimization problem nontrivial. We present an
analytical model to compute the optimal bids for keywords in an advertiser's portfolio. To validate our
approach, we estimate the parameters of the model using data from an advertiser's sponsored search campaign
and use the bids proposed by the model in a field experiment. The results of the field implementation show
that the proposed bidding technique is very effective in practice. We extend our model to account for
interactions between keywords, in the form of positive spillovers from generic keywords into branded
keywords. The spillovers are estimated using a dynamic linear model framework and are used to jointly
optimize the bids of the keywords using an approximate dynamic programming approach. Accounting for the
interaction between keywords leads to an additional improvement in the campaign performance.
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Abstract
We study optimal bidding strategies for advertisers in sponsored search auctions. In gen-
eral, these auctions are run as variants of second-price auctions but have been shown to be
incentive incompatible. Thus, advertisers have to be strategic about bidding. Uncertainty in
the decision-making environment, budget constraints and the presence of a large portfolio of
keywords makes the bid optimization problem non-trivial. We present an analytical model to
compute the optimal bids for keywords in an advertiser’s portfolio. To illustrate the model, we
calibrate the parameters to data from an advertiser’s sponsored search campaign. The results
of a field implementation show that the proposed bidding technique is very effective in practice.
We extend our model to account for interaction between keywords, which is measured by the
spillovers from generic keywords into branded keywords. The spillovers are estimated using a
dynamic linear model framework. Subsequently, we use the estimates of the spillovers to jointly
optimize the bids of the keywords using an approximate dynamic programming approach.
Keywords: Sponsored search, search engine marketing, bid optimization, stochastic optimiza-
tion, stochastic modeling
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1 Introduction
With the growing popularity of search engines among consumers, advertising on search engines has
also grown considerably. Search engine advertising or sponsored search has several unique char-
acteristics relative to traditional advertising and other forms of online advertising. Compared to
traditional advertising in print/television, sponsored search is highly measurable allowing adver-
tisers to identify which keywords are generating clicks and which clicks are getting converted to
purchases. Compared to other forms of online advertising such as banner ads, search advertising
enjoys much higher click-through and conversion rates. Search queries entered by users convey sig-
nificant information about the users’ current need and context and allow search engines to better
target ads to the users than is possible in other forms of online advertising. Further, search engine
users, unlike users on another website, primarily use the search engine to reach some other website.
Advertising is an effective way to enable that process.
Search engines commonly use Pay Per Click (PPC) auctions to sell their available inventory of
ad positions for any search query. The auction mechanism is referred to as the Generalized Second
Price (GSP) auction. In these auctions, advertisers select keywords of interest, create brief text
ads for the keywords and submit a bid for each keyword which indicates their willingness to pay
for every click. For example, a travel agent may submit the following set of two tuples {(miami
vacation, $10), (hawaii vacation, $15), (best travel deals, $5),...} where the first element in any
two-tuple is the keyword and the second element is the advertiser’s bid. Large advertisers typically
bid on hundreds of thousands of keywords at any instant. When a user types a query, the search
engine identifies all advertisers bidding on that (or a closely related) keyword and displays their ads
in an ordered list. The search engine uses the advertisers’ bids along with measures of ad relevance
to rank order the submitted ads. Whenever a consumer clicks on an ad in a given position, the
search engine charges the corresponding advertiser a cost per click (CPC) which is the minimum
bid needed to secure that position. The auctions are continuous sealed bid auctions. That is,
advertisers can change their bids at any time and cannot observe the bids of their competitors.
Typically advertisers are only given summary reports with details such as the total number of
impressions, clicks and conversions, average rank and average CPC for each keyword on a given
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day. Several of these auctions are very competitive. For example, in March 2006, there were 177
advertisers bidding in the Yahoo auction for the keyword “car insurance” with the maximum bid
being $14.01 per click. The average CPC on search engines has been continually rising over the
last couple of years and search advertising is increasingly becoming a major advertising channel for
several firms.
The GSP auction described above differs from traditional auctions in a number of ways. First,
search engines display multiple ads in response to a user query. However, the auction cannot be
treated as a multi-unit auction because each ad position is different in the sense that top positions
generate more clicks for the same number of ad impressions. Further, the CPC increases as the
rank of an ad decreases (i.e. the CPC is higher for top ranked ad than a lower ranked ad). Thus,
the advertiser has to trade-off a higher number of clicks attained at a top position against the lower
margin per click. Due to this trade-off, it may sometimes be better for an advertiser to underbid
and sacrifice a few clicks in order to get a higher margin per click. Indeed, several authors have
demonstrated that popular second-price search auctions such as those used by Google and Yahoo are
not incentive compatible (Aggarwal, Hosanagar and Smith 2008; Edelman, Ostrovsky and Schwarz
2007). Thus, bidding one’s true valuation is often suboptimal. Further, advertisers have short-term
budget constraints which imply that bids cannot be submitted independently for keywords. For
example, if the advertiser submits a very high bid for the keyword “hawaii vacation” then it is likely
that the keyword consumes a significant portion of the advertiser’s budget leaving a very limited
budget for another keyword. Therefore the bids for the thousands of keywords are inextricably
linked. Finally, considerable uncertainty exists in the sponsored search environment. For example,
the number of queries for “miami vacation” on any given day is stochastic and is a function of
the weather, special events in Miami and a variety of other unknown factors. Similarly, consumer
click behavior cannot be precisely predicted and the bids of competitors are also unknown due to
the sealed bid nature of the auction. The stochasticity in query arrival, consumer click behavior
and competitors’ bids imply that the number of clicks and total cost associated with any bid
are all stochastic. All these factors - namely the incentive incompatibility of the auction, budget
constraints, large portfolio of keywords and uncertainty in the decision environment - make the
advertiser’s problem of bidding in sponsored search a non-trivial optimization problem. In this
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paper, we formulate and solve the advertiser’s decision problem.
The paper makes three main contributions. The first is a contribution towards improving
managerial practice. Advertisers spend billions of dollars on sponsored search. An entire industry
of Search Engine Marketing (SEM) firms have emerged that provide bid management services. The
techniques described in the paper can help increase the Return on Investment (RoI) for advertisers
and SEM firms. For example, in a field test of the approach, we observe a 26.4 % increase in
revenues relative to the approach used by an advertiser. The second key contribution is that our
approach represents a significant step forward for the academic literature on bidding in multi-slot
auctions. All the papers to date have studied the problem either in a deterministic setting or in
a single-slot setting and have relied on heuristic solution techniques due to the complexity of the
optimization problem. In contrast, we compute optimal bids in the more realistic stochastic multi-
slot setting. The third contribution of this paper is to incorporate the inter-dependencies between
the keyword into a multi-period bidding problem.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the relevant literature
and position our work within the literature on sponsored search. In Section 3, we formulate the
problem, derive the optimality condition and discuss how it may be used to compute the optimal
bids. In Section 4, we demonstrate the application of our model to a real-world dataset on clicks,
conversions and bids for an advertiser. We contrast the optimal bids computed by our model with
those used by the firm and present results from a field implementation of the bids. Finally, we
discuss the limitations of the work and conclude in Section 6.
2 Literature review
Below, we review three streams of active research within the field of sponsored search with a
particular emphasis on prior work on bidding in sponsored search.
Mechanism Design: Search engines run Pay Per Click auctions in which they charge advertisers
whenever a consumer clicks on an ad.1 A primary area of focus in sponsored search research has
1Other payment rules are also feasible. These include Pay Per Action (PPA) auctions in which advertisers are
charged only if the consumer performs a valid action such as a purchase. Hybrid schemes are also feasible. For
example, in the context of banner ads, Kumar et al. (2007) propose a hybrid pricing model based on a combination
of ad impressions and clicks.
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been the design of the auction mechanism. Two important questions from a mechanism design
perspective are the rules used to rank order the ads and the rules used to determine the amount
paid by advertisers. Feng, Bhargava and Pennock (2007) compare the performance of various
ad ranking mechanisms and find that a yield-optimized auction, that ranks ads based on the
product of the submitted bid and ad relevance, provides the highest revenue to the search engine.
Further, they find that ranking based on bid alone fares nearly as well when bids and relevance
are positively correlated and editorial filters are used to eliminate ads of low relevance. Weber and
Zheng (2007) study competition between two vertically differentiated firms that advertise through
a search intermediary and also find that the intermediary’s revenue maximizing design ranks the
ads based on a weighted average of their bid and product qualities. Liu, Chen and Whinston (2008)
also find that efficient auction design is achieved by weighting bids by click-through rate and further
report that minimum bids should be higher for advertisers with lower click-through rate. In terms
of payment rules, Edelman and Ostrovsky (2007) study first price sponsored search auctions in
which advertisers pay the amount they bid and find empirical evidence of bidding cycles in such
auctions. The authors indicate that a VCG-based mechanism eliminates such bidding cycles and
generates higher revenues for the search engine compared to the first price auction. Zhang and Feng
(2005) and Asdemir (2006) present dynamic bidding models that also predict cyclical patterns in
bidding. The payment rule commonly used by search engines currently is a second price auction
commonly referred to as the GSP auction. Edelman and Ostrovsky (2007) demonstrate that the
GSP auction, unlike Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, is not incentive compatible. Thus,
advertisers have to bid strategically even in the absence of budget constraints. Varian (2007)
also characterizes the Nash equilibrium for a second price multi-slot auction and demonstrates the
auction is not incentive compatible. Aggarwal, Goel and Motwani (2006) propose a “laddered”
auction mechanism that is incentive compatible but the mechanism has not been adopted possibly
due to the complexity of the payment rules.
Consumer behavior in sponsored search: The sponsored search environment presents rich
data on consumer behavior. Modeling users’ propensity to click on ads and to purchase upon
clicking is an important area of recent focus. Several approaches have been proposed to model
clicks for individual keywords and ads (Ali and Scarr 2007; Craswell et al. 2008). However the
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sparseness of clicks and purchase data makes it hard to estimate individual keyword-level models.
Rutz and Bucklin (2008) present a hierarchical Bayesian model of individual keyword conversions
and demonstrate that the model effectively deals with the challenges posed by data sparseness and
keyword heterogeneity. Ghose and Yang (2008) and Agarwal, Hosanagar and Smith (2008) apply
similar models.
Optimal Bidding in Sponsored Search: The stream of work closely related to our paper is
that on budget constrained bidding in sponsored search. Rusmevichientong and Williamson (2006)
propose a model for selecting keywords from a large pool of candidates. Their model does not
however address optimal bidding for these keywords and ignores the multi-slot context. Feldman et
al (2007) study the bid optimization problem and indicate that randomizing between two uniform
strategies that bid equally on all keywords works well. The authors assume that all clicks have the
same value independent of the keyword. Further, their results are derived in a deterministic setting
where the advertisers position, clicks and cost associated with a bid are known precisely. Borgs et
al (2007) propose a bidding heuristic that sets the same average Return on Investment (RoI) across
all keywords. Their model is also derived for a deterministic setting. Finally, Muthukrishnan, Pal
and Svitkina (2007) study bidding in a stochastic environment where there is uncertainty in the
number of queries for any keyword. The authors focus on a single slot auction and find that prefix
bidding strategies that bid on the cheapest keywords work well in many cases. However, they find
that the strategies for single slot auctions do not always extend to multi-slot auctions and that
many cases are NP hard .
The prior work reveals three themes. One, the literature on sponsored search mechanism design
has established that GSP auctions are not incentive compatible. This feature combined with the
advertiser budget constraints suggest a need to develop bidding policies. Two, the empirical work in
sponsored search provide a variety of useful models that can be applied towards modeling consumer
click behavior and bidding behavior of advertisers. These can ultimately be used to develop data-
driven optimization strategies. Three, the issue of budget constrained bidding has received some
attention. While these early papers on bid optimization have helped advance the literature, they
have tended to focus on deterministic settings or single slot auctions, both of which are restrictive
assumptions in the sponsored search context. Further, these papers develop heuristic strategies due
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to the complexity of the optimization problem. In contrast, we determine optimal bids in a budget-
constrained multi-unit multi-slot auction under uncertainty in the decision-making environment.
3 Model
Advertisers usually maintain a portfolio of thousands of keywords. They submit bids for each
keyword on a regular basis during a billing cycle (e.g., several firms submit bids on a daily basis).
During each time period when bids need to be computed, the bid management system accepts a
budget for that time period as an input and computes the bids for all keywords. We adopt the
same framework and focus on the bid optimization problem during a specific time period in which
the budget and the set of keywords have been specified. 2
The effects of sponsored ads are two folds – (i) awareness and (ii) lead generation. Consumers
usually start their search process by using generic terms e.g. “hawaii vacation”. Bidding on these
generic keyword might help the advertiser generate brand-specific (or retailer-specific) exposure in
the form of impressions and clicks. These brand related exposures might enhance the awareness of
a particular brand and it might enter the consideration set of a consumer. The increased awareness
can subsequently lead to increased subsequent branded search activity (“spillover”). There is strong
evidence to suggest that spillovers from generic to branded advertising activity is present in the
context of sponsored search ads (Rutz and Bucklin 2010). More directly, sponsored ad are respon-
sible for lead generation and eventual conversion. An advertiser must weigh in these two effect
while making his ad decisions. For example, there are several generic keywords that lead to several
impressions and clicks but do not directly lead to conversions. The increase the brand awareness
which subsequently results in increase search activity for brand the consumers were exposed to.
3.1 Notation and Setup
In this section we introduce our notation and the general framework we use to study the advertiser’s
decision problem.
2A common practice in the SEM industry is to use Daily Budget = (Remaining Balance)/(Number of days left in
cycle), where remaining balance is the initial monthly budget less the amount spent thus far. We do not focus on
how the budget for a given time period is computed and treat it as an exogenous parameter in our formulation.
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During a given timeperiod (say a day) a keyword k is searched Sk times, where Sk is a random
variable. Sk also represents the total number of impressions, i.e. the number of times the advertiser’s
ad is displayed by the search engine. The expected number of impressions is defined as µk = E[Sk].
The superscript (s) is used to denote the sth search. We denote the bid of the advertiser for the
keyword as bk, and assume that the advertiser does not change the bid during the timeperiod.
Every time the keyphrase is searched, the advertiser’s ad is placed at some position in the list of
all sponsored results. Let pos
(s)
k be the position at which the ad was shown in the s
th search, with
the topmost position denoted position 0. Let δ
(s)
k be an indicator of whether a person who was
searching for the keyword clicked on the advertiser’s link, or not: δ
(s)
k = I
(
click
(s)
k
)
. An analysis
of click-through data by Feng et al. (2007) suggests that the probability that a user clicks on an
ad in position pos
(s)
k = i is
Pr{δ(s)k = 1|pos(s)k = i} =
αk
(γk)i
where αk and γk are keyword specific constants indicating the probability of a click at the top-
most position and the rate at which the click probability decays with the rank of the ad respectively.
The advertiser’s value from a click is denoted by an independent random variable wk. v
(s)
k
denotes the advertiser’s value from the sth impression. It is equal to 0 if the user does not click
and equal to wk if the user clicks (v
(s)
k = δ
(s)
k wk). Let b
(s)
k be the advertiser’s cost per click i.e. the
bid of the advertiser at the next position pos
(s)
k + 1. The cost associated with impression s may
then be expressed as c
(s)
k = δ
(s)
k b
(s)
k .
3 Because consumers do not know any advertiser’s bid, it seems
reasonable to assume that given an ad’s position in the list, the probability that a person clicks
on the ad does not depend on the bid of the next advertiser. That is, conditional on the position
pos
(i)
k , the vector
(
b
(i)
k , δ
(i)
k
)
has independent components. We also assume that Sk is independent
of other variables.
Besides the advertiser there areNk other advertisers who place their bids for keyword k. Initially,
we assume thatNk is known to the advertiser. It can be observed, for example, by submitting sample
3The discussion assumes that ads are ordered by bid and that the advertiser pays the bid of the next advertiser.
A common practice is to use the product of bid and a quality score to rank order the advertisers, and the payment
is the minimum bid needed to secure the position (e.g. the payment per click for an advertiser in position i is
bid(i + 1) ∗Quality(i + 1)/Quality(i). This does not affect our model. If we normalize the bid of all competitors by
the ratio of their quality score relative to our advertiser (NormalizedBid = bid∗QualityCompetitor/QualityAdvertiser),
our analysis can be interpreted as based on this normalized bid.
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queries to the search engine and observing the number of ads displayed. Subsequently, we relax this
assumption in Section 3.4 and derive our results for a case in which Nk is a random variable. The
bids of the competitors cannot be observed because the auction is a sealed bid auction. The key
assumption we make is that the competitors place their bids according to some known distribution
Fk (b). This assumption can be interpreted in multiple ways. One way is to assume that each
competitor submits his bid according to this distribution. Alternatively, they determine their bids
using some process that is unknown but the resulting final distribution of all their bids is Fk (b).
Finally, D denotes the advertiser’s budget in a given timeperiod of interest. Table 1 summarizes
our notation.
3.2 Model Formulation
The advertiser faces the following decision problem:
max
{bk}
E
[∑
k
Sk∑
s=1
v
(s)
k |bk
]
(1)
s.t. E
[∑
k
Sk∑
s=1
c
(s)
k |bk
]
≤ D.
The objective is to determine bids bk in order to maximize the advertiser’s expected revenues.
The constraint implies that the expected cost should be less than or equal to a budget D. Note
that the budget is not modeled as a hard constraint. This is a common format in which budget
constraint is specified by advertisers in the SEM industry, and reflects an objective function of
the form max{bk}E
[∑
k
∑Sk
s=1(v
(s)
k − λc(s)k )|bk
]
. Thus, the objective is to maximize expected profit
but the shadow price of ad dollars is specified in the form of a constraint on the expected cost.
The optimization problem in Equation (1) always has a solution as shown in Appendix A1 (All
important proofs appear in the Appendix). Solving the problem gives the following optimality
condition
∀k : d
dbk
E
[
Sk∑
s=1
v
(s)
k |bk
]
= λ
d
dbk
E
[
Sk∑
s=1
c
(s)
k |bk
]
. (2)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier. The optimality condition states that for the optimal bids
the ratio of the marginal change in the advertiser’s expected revenues over the marginal change
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in the advertiser’s expected cost should be constant across keywords. An alternative way to in-
terpret it is as follows. If we decrease the bid for keyphrase k′ by ε, then the expected cost will
decrease by ε ddbk′
E
∑Sk′
s=1
[
c
(s)
k′ |bk′
]
and, hence, we may increase the bid for another keyphrase k by
ε ddbk′
E
∑Sk′
s=1
[
c
(s)
k′ |bk′
]
/ ddbkE
∑Sk
s=1
[
c
(s)
k |bk
]
. In this case the expected increase in profits will be
ε
d
dbk
E
∑Sk
s=1
[
v
(s)
k |bk
]
d
dbk′
d
dbk
E
∑Sk
s=1
[
c
(s)
k |bk
] E Sk′∑
s=1
[
c
(s)
k′ |bk′
]
− ε d
dbk′
E
Sk′∑
s=1
[
v
(s)
k′ |bk′
]
= 0.
We assume that consumer click behavior and competitor bidding behavior is i.i.d across ad im-
pressions during the given time period. Hence, in Expression (2) we may cancel the sums over s.
Therefore, the optimal vector of bids should satisfy the following condition:
∀k : d
dbk
E [vk|bk] = λ d
dbk
E [ck|bk] . (3)
3.3 Optimality Condition
It is hard to use the optimality condition (3) to compute the optimal bids. In order to apply (3),
the advertiser has to be able to compute E [vk|bk] and E [ck|bk] accounting for the uncertainty in
competing bids and consumer query and click behavior. In this Section, we express the optimality
condition in terms of parameters that can be estimated. We assume that the number of competitors
Nk is known and is constant. We can identify the number of competitors by performing a search
on keyword k at a search engine.
Consider a specific keyword k . We tentatively drop the subscript k as we focus on an individual
keyword. In order to compute E [v|b], we need to identify the probability of a click given the bid
b, which in turn depends on the probability distribution of the ad position . The conditional
probability of being at position i conditional on a bid b is
Pr {pos = i|b} =
 N
i
 (1− F (b))i F (b)N−i . (4)
The probability that a competitor bids more than b is equal to 1 − F (b), and the probability of
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obtaining a position i given bid b is determined by a Bernoulli process. Recollect that the positions
start from 0, i.e., the topmost ad has position pos = 0. Thus the position i indicates that there are
i other advertisers ranked above. Feng, Bhargava and Pennock’s (2007) analysis of click-through
data suggests that the probability that a user clicks on an ad in position pos is
Pr {δ = 1|pos = i} = α
γi
, (5)
where α and γ are keyword specific constants. It follows that
Pr {δ = 1|b} =
∑
i
Pr {δ = 1|pos = i}Pr {pos = i|b} (6)
=
∑
i
α
γi
 N
i
 (1− F (b))i F (b)N−i
= αγ−N (1 + (γ − 1)F (b))N .
Proposition 1: The expected value of an impression is given by
E [v|b] = E [δw|b] = Pr {δ = 1|b}Ew = αγ−N (1 + (γ − 1)F (b))N Ew. (7)
It follows from Proposition 1 that
d
db
E [v|b] = αNγ−N (γ − 1)f (b) (1 + (γ − 1)F (b))N−1. (8)
We now derive an expression for E [c|b]. In order to do so, we need to characterize the probability
distribution function of the bid of the next advertiser in the list of sponsored results. We first derive
some intermediate results.
Lemma 1: The distribution function of the bid of the next advertiser in the list conditional on
the bid and the position is given by
F (b|b, pos = i) =
(
F (b)
F (b)
)N−i
. (9)
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Applying,
F (b|b, pos = i, δ = 1) = F (b|b, pos = i) =
(
F (b)
F (b)
)N−i
, (10)
we can derive the following lemma.
Lemma 2: The conditional distribution of the bid of the next advertiser conditional on the bid
and the fact that the ad was clicked is
F (b|b, δ = 1) =
N∑
i=0
F (b|b, δ = 1, pos = i)× Pr {pos = i|b, δ = 1} (11)
=
(
1− F (b) + γF (b)
1 + (γ − 1)F (b)
)N
.
When a user clicks on an ad, the advertiser has to pay the bid of the next advertiser in the list.
Applying Lemma 2 and Equation (6) gives us
Proposition 2: The expected cost of an impression is given by
E [c|b] = E [δb|b] (12)
= E [b|b, δ = 1] Pr {δ = 1|b}
= αγ−N
(
b[1 + (γ − 1)F (b)]N −
ˆ b
0
[1− F (b) + γF (b)]Ndb
)
.
Using Proposition 2 we can derive that
dE[c|b]
db
= αNγ−Nf(b)
(
(γ − 1)b[1 + (γ − 1)F (b)]N−1 +
ˆ b
0
[1− F (b) + γF (b)]N−1db
)
. (13)
Substituting Expressions (8) and (13) in Equation (3),
dE[v|b]
db
= λ
dE[c|b]
db
,
1
λ
=
1
Ew
(
b+
´ b
0 [1− F (b) + γF (b)]N−1db
(γ − 1)[1 + (γ − 1)F (b)]N−1
)
.
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Proposition 3: The optimality condition (expressed in terms of estimable parameters) is
∀k : 1
Ewk
(
bk +
´ bk
0 [1− Fk(bk) + γkFk(b)]Nk−1db
(γk − 1)[1 + (γk − 1)F (bk)]Nk−1
)
= const. (14)
Proposition 4: A unique bid b∗k satisfies the optimality condition (Equation 14) for keyword k
when
γk > 1 +
1
Fk(b)
[
fk(b)(Nk − 1)
´ b
0 [1− Fk(b) + γkFk(x)]Nk−2dx
[1 + (γk − 1)Fk(b)]Nk−2 − 1
]
.
The optimality condition can be used in conjunction with the budget constraint to compute
the optimal bids. For several common distribution and a wide range of parameters, we show in the
appendix that the conditions for a unique bid (Proposition 4) are satisfied. In order to compute
the optimal bids, the following keyword-specific constants need to be known: αk (the click-through
rate at the top position), γk (rate at which CTR decays with position), Ewk (expected revenue
from a click), Nk (number of competing bidders), and Fk() (distribution of competing bids). We
estimate these parameters using a real-world dataset and illustrate how bids may be computed in
Section 4.
3.4 Bid Computations
In this section we use the estimated parameters to compute the optimal bids. The optimal bids
should satisfy equation (14)
1
Ewk
(
bk +
´ bk
0 [1− Fk(bk) + γkFk(b)]Nk−1db
(γk − 1)[1 + (γk − 1)F (bk)]Nk−1
)
= const, (15)
and the budget constraint,
E
[∑
k
∑
s
c
(s)
k
]
= D.
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The parameters estimated in Section 4.1 satisfy the uniqueness condition specified in Proposition
(4). The last constraint can be rewritten as
∑
k
µkαkγ
−Nk
k
(
bk[1 + (γk − 1)Fk(bk)]Nk −
ˆ bk
0
[1− Fk(bk) + γkFk(b)]Nkdb
)
= D. (16)
For a given const in Equation (15), we compute the bid that satisfies the equation for every
keyword. Then we use Equation (16) to calculate the expected total cost for the computed bids. If
the expected cost is lower than D, we increase the constant, otherwise we decrease it. The process
repeats until the expected total cost is sufficiently close to the budget.
4 Data Description
Our dataset is from a leading meat distributor that sells through company owned retails stores as
well as through mail-order catalogs and online. This firm bids on thousands of keywords across
several search engines and has a substantial online presence. Our dataset consists of daily summary
records for 247 keywords which this firm uses to advertise on Google. We divide these keywords
in 29 unique product categories which span frozen meats, seafoods and desserts. A comprehensive
list of these product categories appears in Table 1. The daily record for every keyword has the
following fields,
(id, t, b, i, cl, avgcpc, avgpos)
where
id - Unique identifier for each keyword
t - date
b - bid submitted by advertiser
i - number of impressions during the day
cl - number of clicks during the day
avgcpc - average cost per click on the day
avgpos- average position during the day
This dataset is representative of the the type of data available to advertisers in sponsored search.
Advertisers only get summary reports from search engines and do not have information on clicks
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Figure 1: Illustration of the timeline for the various data collection periods.
and position for each individual ad impression.
Our dataset is divided into three distinct periods as shown in Figure 1. The first period runs
from March 1-May 31, 2011. This period forms the“before”period for our analysis during which the
bids for these 247 keywords were decided by the firm spanning 29 product categories show in Table
1. The summary statistics for the data during this period is shown in Table 2. In this duration,
there were 1.36 million impressions of these ads and they received 11,651 clicks in total. The total
weekly cost of these ads was $964 and the weekly gross revenue generated from these keywords
was $1728. We use the data from this period to compute the expected value per-click (Ew) and
the expected daily impressions (S) for each keyword. For the subsequent analysis we randomly
divide these keywords by product categories into three distinct groups. The first group forms the
control group for our experiment. We use the keywords in Group I to measure the effectiveness of
the myopic bidding policy outlined in Section 3 to and the keywords in Group II to measure the
effectiveness of the forward looking policy we will outline in Section 6. The three groups are fairly
well matched in terms of the product categories included within each group as well as in terms of
summary statistics across these groups which are presented in Table 3. The control group forms
the baseline to eliminate any time trends that might enter the analysis due to changes in online
activity or search engine strategy.
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Table 1: Product Categories
Bacon Flat Iron Pork
Beef Gift Basket Porterhouse
Beef Jerky Gifts Prime Rib
Beef Sirloin Halibut Salmon
Burgers Ham Shrimp
Catfish Hot Dogs Sole
Cheesecake Lobster Surf and Turf
Corned Beef Lobster Bisque Swordfish
Crab London Broil Trout
Filet Mignon Orange Roughy
Table 2: Summary Statistics
Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Bid 1.18 1.01 0.35 10.00
Avg CPC 0.73 0.59 0.00 4.42
Avg Pos 3.15 1.90 1.00 12.41
Impressions 5637.22 13106.39 1.00 98373.00
Clicks 48.37 86.76 0.00 593.00
CTR 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.60
Cost 45.95 95.11 0.00 747.43
Revenue 83.26 132.47 0.00 974.31
Gross Profit 37.31 140.78 -747.43 902.20
RPC 4.33 14.30 0.00 158.96
Table 3: Summary for the three groups of keywords.
Control Group I Group II
Products Categories 8 10 10
Keywords 55 89 85
Impressions/Keyword 5637.80 6783.64 4989.04
Clicks/Keyword 50.53 64.26 35.81
CTR 0.0089 0.0095 0.0072
CPC 0.92 1.04 1.00
RPC 1.69 1.71 1.85
ROI 0.84 0.65 0.85
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The second period spans from July 1-July 31, 2011 which we refer to as the “estimation period”
for our analysis.We ignore the month of June from our analysis as there is a hugh increase in online
activity during this month due to Father’s Day. During this period bids for the control group
are held constant but we submit random bids for the keywords in Groups I and II. The bids are
uniformly drawn from $0.10 × [1, 30] resulting in a minum bid of 10¢ to a maximum bid of $3.00.
The upper limit of $3.00 was prescribed by the advertiser. The bids are drawn weekly which leads to
four unique bids per keyword in the estimation period. This variation in bids leads to a significant
variation in the ad position and helps the identification of the parameters of the model. The exact
identification strategy is discussed later on in Section 5.
Finally, optimal bids are computed based on estimated parameters and deployed by the firm
between August21-September 21, 2011. These bids are re-estimated every week incorporating recent
data in the analysis. This period forms our “after” period. Data from the after period is used to
access the effectiveness of both the myopic policy that ignores interaction between keywords and
the forward looking policy that incorporates the interaction between keywords. In Section 5 we
discuss the estimation of parameters using data from the “estimation period”. Subsequently, we
discuss the results from the field implementation of the myopic policy.
5 Empirical Analysis
In this section we apply our technique to a real-world dataset of clicks and costs for several key-
words and derive the optimal bids for these keywords. We then describe the results from a field
implementation of the suggested bids.
5.1 Estimation Approach
Our data provide daily summary measures (average position, average cost per click, total clicks)
but not the outcome of each individual impression. Given just these daily summary measures, it is
hard to apply regression or Maximum Likelihood Estimation techniques directly on the aggregated
data, hence we using the Generalized Methods of Moment (GMM) approach to estimate these
parameters. Following the idea of the method of moments, we derive analytical expressions for the
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moments we observe emperically, namely, the expected position (avgpost), cost per click (avgcpct)
and click-through rate (ctrt = clt/it) for every keyword, where t is the time index. These moment
are as follows,
E (post|bt) = Nt (1− F (bt)) , (17)
E (bt|bt, δt = 1) =
ˆ
x<bt
xd
(
1− F (bt) + γF (x)
1− (1− γ)F (bt)
)Nt
, (18)
E (δt|bt) = αγ−Nt (1− (1− γ)F (bt))Nt . (19)
The observered moments can be expressed in terms of the analytical moments in the following
manner
avgpost = E (post|bt) + ξ1t,
avgcpct = E (bt|bt, δt = 1) + ξ2t,
ctrt = E (δt|bt) + ξ3t,
where ξt = (ξ1t, ξ2t, ξ3t)
′ is the random shock. This is the most general formulation of our model.
However, we make several assumptions in order to estimate this model from the available data – (i)
As the data contains only the daily aggregates, we cannot directly estimate the distribution function
F (b) using nonparametric approaches as we have very few bids for every keywords. To address this
constraint associated with our dataset, we enforce a parametric form on the distribution F (b),
and estimate its parameters using the first moments associated with the position, cost per click
and click-through rate. For the parametric form of the distribution F (.) we choose the Weibull
distribution. This choice is based on two factors. Firstly, the Weibull distribution can take on
diverse shapes and offers a great deal of flexibility. Secondly, an analysis of a secondary dataset of
bids submitted to a search engine for several keywords in the insurance sector (Abhishek, Hosanagar
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and Fader, 2009) shows that the Weibull distribution is reasonably good for modeling the bids.4
Note that we are not assuming that the distribution of bids for keywords is the same across the
two datasets, rather that the bids are from the same family (Weibull) and the parameters can vary
across keywords. The Weibull distribution has the following cumulative distribution function
F (x; θ, λ) = 1− exp
{
−
(x
λ
)θ}
.
It is defined by two parameters θ and λ. Therefore, we have four unknowns parameters for any
keyword (λ, θ, α, γ) and 3 moment conditions for every unique bid. (ii) The other simplifying
assumptions we make are thatNt is deterministic during the day. Nt on a particular day is estimated
as the average number of competing ads in the in the estimation period. This assumption might be
problematic when Nt is small as the variation in the ad position can be driven partly by a variation
in Nt, however when Nt is sufficiently large as in our dataset, this does not effect the estimation
procedure significantly.
The estimates of the parameter β = (α, γ, λ, θ) is given by
βˆ = arg min
β∈B
ξ(β)′Wξ(β),
where ξ(β) is vector of error between the observed and computed moments for a particular keyword
during the observation period and W is a weighting matrix. The choice of W is critical as it
determines the asymptotic properties of the estimator and in our analysis W is a consistent estimate
of E[ξ(β)′ξ(β)]. As we do not know E[ξ(β)′ξ(β)], an iterative-GMM estimator is used (see Hanson,
Heaton and Yaron, 1996) where is the weighting matrix is iteratively re-estimated till it converges.
In order to compute the optimal bids we also need to know Ew, the expected revenue per-
click. The expected revenue per-click is provided to us by the firm and we assume that it does not
change over the course of this field experiment. The firm uses a technique similar to the first-click
attribution method that is commonly used in online advertising. More sophisticated techniques can
be used to estimate Ew but this discussion is outside the scope of this current paper. It should be
4We tried several distributions like the Normal, Log-Normal, Gamma, Exponential and Logit but the Weibull dis-
tribution is the best representation for tha advertisers’ bids. This is not a resetrictive assumption and any parametric
distribution can be plugged in the general estimation procedure outline here.
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kept in mind that we do not assume that the value per-click is constant but assume that conditional
on a click, the consumer’s subsequent behavior is i.i.d (i.e. independent of the position of the ad
etc.). Although this might not true under all circumstances as pointed out by Ghose and Yang
(2009) and Agarwal et. al. (2011), this assumption is commonly used in practice and academic
literature (Rusmevichientong and Williamson, 2007).
5.2 Identification Strategy
The parameters of this model can be estimated if we have at least 2 unique bids per keyword in the
data. However, there are two important reasons why historical data cannot be used to estimate the
parameters of this model - (i) insufficient variation in bids (ii) potential endogeneity in advertiser’s
bids.5
5.2.1 Limited Variation in Bids
In typical SSA campaigns advertisers change their bids very infrequently, usually once in several
months, hence it is difficult to identify the parameters of the model. In our dataset, there are
very few changes in the bids for the keywords and the average number of unique bids per keyword
is 1.12. Discussions with the campaign manager revealed that the bids for these keywords are
updated very infrequently, sometimes on a quarterly basis given the huge portfolio of keywords.
This phenomenon is not specific to our firm but is widely applicable in the industry and has been
pointed out earlier by Rutz and Bucklin (2011) and Ghose and Yang (2009). As our model is
underidentifed with less than two unique bids, we use the period of random bidding to generate
random bids which would lead to sufficient variability in the bids drawn for a particular keyword
across days. This in turn leads to leads to a significant variation in the ad position and helps the
identification of the parameters of the model.
5.2.2 Endogeneity of Bids
The second concern with using historical data is the potential endogeneity of bids. In order for
the GMM to provide consistent estimate we require that E[bξ] = 0 or the bids and the random
5We thanks the reviewers for the suggestion to disscuss the identification strategy.
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shock are independent of each other. However, as the firm is bidding strategically it might increase
the bid for a particular keyword if there is a random increase in demand, for example on a sunny
weekend. Hence it is very likely that the bids for a particular keyword are correlated with these
random shock in the before period. Since we as researchers are unaware of these random shocks
which the advertiser might be aware of, we need to correct for this potential endogeneity in bids.
One way to address this endogeneity can be using an instrumental variable (IV) approach. Another
way to address this issue can be using random bids. Given the lack of variation in the bids in the
before period, we resort to the latter technique.
5.3 Estimation Details and Results
In order to estimate the parameters, a nonlinear solver is used to estimate the parameters in our
implementation. 6 The parameter estimates for a few representative keywords are shown in Table
4. N represents the mean number of daily competiting ads in the observation period. For brevity,
we plot the distribution of the estimated parameters for all keywords in Groups I and II in Figure
XXX. A complete table is available from the authors upon request.
Table 4: Parameter estimates for a sample subset of keywords.
keyword λ θ α γ N Ew($)
beef sirloin steak 1.7651 0.5351 0.0266 2.1237 9.5 0.00
Steak Burger 0.6697 2.1944 0.0069 1.2915 5.1 1.53
cheesecakes 0.9736 1.3265 0.0004 1.6091 7.0 1.08
Porterhouse Steak 1.1413 0.8639 0.008 1.1661 4.6 0.43
smoke salmon 1.3414 1.1752 0.0073 1.0255 10.1 6.62
corned beef 1.5368 0.7492 0.0018 1.0175 10.7 3.80
hot dog order 1.0769 1.0869 0.0101 1.6486 7.3 3.00
birthday gifts 1.1756 0.842 0.0009 1.0659 40.2 5.74
birthday present 0.7524 1.3841 0.0122 1.0434 7.1 0.45
lobster bisque 1.311 1.0074 0.0145 1.9293 11.3 0.00
Although there is significant heterogeneity between the keywords, the estimated parameter
values are fairly typical in a sponsored search context. The mean click-through rate (α) at the
topmost position is 0.026 and the mean decay parameter (γ) is 1.68 which is similar to the values
reported earlier (Feng et. al.,2007, Craswell et. al., 2008). Clearly, given the variation in the
6We use the Fletcher-Xu hybrid method provided as a part of the ClsSolve routine in TOMLAB.
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revenue per-click (Ew) across keywords some keywords are more profitable than other, however
the relative competitiveness of the keywords should be accounted for while deciding the optimal
bids of these keywords.
5.4 Field Implementation
Once we estimate parameters α, γ, λ and θ for all keywords in Group I and II, we estimate the
optimal bids for these keywords. In this section we will focus on the myopic policy outlined in
Section 3 and hence we discuss the results of the field implmentation only for Group I. In the
subsequent section, once we outline the details of the forward looking policy, we will revisit the
field implementation details for keywords in Group II.
For the keywords in Group I, we use a daily budget D = $72.00 based on the mean weekly
spending of around $500 during the 3 month “before” period. The bids are recomputed every
week after we estimate the parameters (α, γ, λ, θ) based on new data, however there is not much
change in the bids across weeks. The bids are recomputed to account for competitive reaction as
well as changes in the parameters driving consumer click behavior. A more detailed discussion on
competitve reaction follows in Section 7.
Table 5: Parameter estimates for a sample subset of keywords.
keyword Old Bids ($) New Bids ($)
beef sirloin steak 0.82 0.00
Steak Burger 2.19 0.95
cheesecakes 0.66 0.70
Porterhouse Steak 0.76 0.30
smoke salmon 1.16 2.55
corned beef 0.31 3.00
hot dogs order 0.76 1.85
birthday gifts 0.96 1.75
birthday present 1.61 0.20
lobster bisque 0.46 0.00
The rationale for these bids can be inferred from the parameters listed in Table 4. Consider,
for example, bids for keywords smoke salmon, hot dogs order and birthday gifts. Our algorithm
suggests increasing their bids. For keywords smoke salmon and hot dogs order, we observe that
their expected value per click (Ew) is high and it makes sense that the algorithm is suggesting
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that we increase their bids. The keyword birthday gifts has a substantially Ew, yet its bid is not
raised by a significant amount. This is because the keyword is very expensive (low θ) and it is very
difficult to attained the top position. There are other keywords where it is worthwhile to spend the
advertising dollars.
The suggested bids were deployed in the field by the advertiser for a period of 4 weeks.7 During
the 12 weeks in the “before” period, the firm spent a total of $5937.58 on the keywords in Group II
and obtained revenues of $9776.10. In the“after”period, the total cost and total revenues associated
with the keywords were $3178.82 and $4594.43 respectively. In the same periods the total cost and
total revenues associated with the control keywords were $1667.54 and $1480.80 respectively. We
use a Difference-in-Difference approach to compute the effect of our algorithm. The improvement
in perfomance due to the algorithm is given by
τAlgo = ∆ROIGroup I −∆ROIControl
= (44.53%− 64.65%)− (−11.20%− 84.30%)
= 75.38%
The performance of the advertising campaing increases by 75.38% as a result of the proposed
algorithm. We however notice that there is an absolute decrease in the ROI in the campaing
compared to the “before” time period and this decrease is very noticeable for the Control group.
After several discussions with the advertiser, we concluded that this decrease is due to some changes
in the manner that the search engine displays search results. From July onwards, the search engine
started showing a yellow background color for some of the top ads which reported to a significant
increase in the CTR of the ads. This phenomenon has been reported by several blogs. A more
careful analysis of the advertiser’s portfolio revealed that not only had the CTR increased for similar
keywords in the same duration, but also the performance of these keywords had fallen considerably
during this time. For the Control group we see an increase in the CTR from 0.89% to 1.4% and
for the keywords in Group II we see a change from 1.04% to 1.15%. The increase in CTR might
account for the increased costs of these keywords.
7Thes parameters and the bids are re-estimated every week, but there is very little change in the parameters or
the suggested bids during this period.
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6 Incorporating Interdependence between Keywords
The preceding discussion assumes that keywords are independent of each other. In reality, con-
sumers search across several keywords before making a purchase decision and this might lead to
interaction between keywords. E.g. a consumer might start of his search with a generic keyword
like “hawaii vacation” but eventually ends up searching for “Marriott hawaii vacations”. While
searching for vacations in Hawaii, he could have been exposed to ads from Marriott which became
a part of his consideration set. As a result, he searched for “Marriott hawaii vacations” which
potentially lead to a purchase from Marriott. If the advertiser was not advertising on the generic
keyword “hawaii vacations”, the consumer could never be exposed to the ad from Marriott and
and this would lead to a lost sale for Marriott. This example illustrates that although some ads
(e.g. generic ads) do not lead to direct conversions, they help the advertiser in creating awareness
about the brand/product which can increase the probability that it becomes a part of the con-
sumer’s consideration set. More specifically in our context, these brand related exposures can lead
to enhanced awareness of a particular brand which might subsequently lead to increased branded
search activity (“spillover”). Rutz and Bucklin (2010) show that there are considerable spillovers
from generic to branded search activity in the context of sponsored search ads. This suggests that
there are complementarity effects between keywords and advertisers should incorporate the effects
of spillovers while making their bidding decisions.
6.1 Measuring Spillovers
In order to incorporate the spillover-effect in our decision model we first need to estimate the
changes in awareness due to search activity and its affect on future search activity. We use the
Nerlove-Arrow model (Rutz and Bucklin 2010, Naik et. al. 1998, Nerlove and Arrow 1962) to
capture the evolution of awareness
dAt
dt
= −α˜AAt + βXt, (20)
where At refers to the awareness level at time t, α˜
A measures the decay of awareness with time,
Xt is a vector of covariates that capture the search activity at time t and β captures the extent
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to which different kinds of search activity affect the level of awareness. Let the keywords belong
to two groups: G - generic and B - branded. The total number of generic impressions at time
t is defined as IMPGt =
∑
k∈G ik,t and the total number of branded impressions at time t is
defined as IMPBt =
∑
k∈B ik,t, where ik,t are the impressions for keyword k at time t. Similarly,
the total number of generic and branded clicks at time t are defined as CLKGt =
∑
k∈G clk,t and
CLKBt =
∑
k∈B clk,t, respectively. As we only observe daily data, we use a discrete time analogue
of the model presented in Equation (20),
At = α
AAt−1 + βCLKG CLK
G
t−1 + β
CLK
B CLK
B
t−1 + ε
A
t , (21)
where αA = (1 − α˜A) captures the carry-over rate of awareness and εAt is the idiosyncratic error
term. Like Rutz and Bucklin (2010) we assume that the awareness at time t is affected by the
generic search activity at time t but in addition we also assume that branded search activity might
also have an impact on awareness. Awareness is not observed in the data and is latent in this
state-space model.
Equation (21) specifies the manner in which search activity affects awareness. Next, we outline
how awareness affects both generic and branded search activity. In our model, we assume that
awareness only affects the consumer’s propensity to search but it has no effect on the consumer
behavior after the search is executed. This implies that awareness affects the number of impressions
(queries) but has no impact on the click-through or conversion rates. This assumption is in keeping
with the findings of Rutz and Bucklin (2010) who show that awareness does not have a statistically
significant impact on click − through and conversion rates. We assume that awareness leads to
change in the search activity for the generic and branded ads in the following manner,
IMPGt = α
IMP
G IMP
G
t−1 + γ
IMP
G At−1 + ε
G,IMP
t , (22)
IMPBt = α
IMP
B IMP
B
t−1 + γ
IMP
B At−1 + ε
B,IMP
t . (23)
It should be noted that the affect of awareness is computed from aggregate data (not individually
for each keyword). In order to have a parsimonious model we assume that the spillover effect is
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constant across all branded keywords and is given by γIMPB . Similarly, the spillover effect across
generic keywords is constant and is given by γIMPG .
We use a Dynamic Linear Model (DLM) to estimate the parameters in Equations (21)-(23).
Combining these equation we get

IMPGt
IMPBt
At
 =

αIMPG γ
IMP
G
αIMPB γ
IMP
B
βIMPG β
IMP
B α
A


IMPGt−1
IMPBt−1
At−1
+

0
0∑
i=G,B
βCLKi CLK
i
t−1
+

εG,IMPt
εB,IMPt
εAt

where the correlated error terms ε...t account for random shocks and ε ∼ N(0, Vε) . DLM have been
used in several situations where an important component of the model is unobserved (Bass et. al.
2007, Naik et. al. 2009, Rutz and Bucklin 2010). We estimate this model a Markov Chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) approach as proposed by West and Harrison (1997). The variation in the number
of impressions and clicks for generic and branded keywords help us identify the parameters of the
model.
The estimated parameters of the model are as follows
[Table containing the estimation results]
We find that there is a significant spillover from generic search activity into branded search.
First, we find that there is a strong positive impact of generic clicks on awareness (βCLKG > 0).
Second, increased awareness leads to increased branded search activity (γIMPB > 0). We can
combine these results to say that every click on a generic ad increases the number of branded
impressions by γIMPB β
CLK
G . We also observe that the effects of branded click on awareness and
awareness on generic search activity are insignificant (βCLKB ≈ 0, γIMPB ≈ 0). These finding are
consistent with the results reported by Rutz and Bucklin (2010). It is reasonable to believe that
awareness about a particular brand does not affect consumers’ generic search behavior. Similarly,
if a consumer is already aware of a brand, clicking on a branded ad is less likely to change his
awareness about the brand. In the subsequent discussion we assume that only generic clicks affect
future search behavior and this effect is limited to branded searches. We also assume that all generic
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clicks are the same and have exactly the same impact on all branded keywords. More formally,
µk,t+1 = α
IMP
B µk,t + γ
IMP
B β
CLK
G CLK
CLK
G,t−1 ∀ k ∈ B, (24)
µk,t+1 = α
IMP
G µk,t ∀ k ∈ G.
Equation (24) shows that every click on a generic ad on average leads to γIMPB β
Clk
G = [InsertV alue]
more searches (and hence impressions) of all branded ads. The increased impressions for branded
keywords, which are usually more profitable, leads to higher revenues in future periods.
6.2 Bid Computation with the Awareness Effect
Bidding on keywords has two effects - current period revenues and future awareness as discussed
earlier. We see in the preceding analysis, awareness is generated primarily through clicks on generic
ads which usually have a low expected value per click. As a result, the advertiser faces a trade-off
between maximizing current period revenues or increasing awareness (through more generic clicks)
to increase revenues in the future. We consider the advertiser’s problem of deciding the bids for the
keywords in each time period so as to maximize the total profits. Most sponsored search campaign
are active for a fixed amount of time hence we assume that the campaign runs for T time periods.
We also assume that the ad spend in every time period should be less than D. Advertisers usually
decide their daily or weekly advertising budget which do not change frequently. In fact, several
search engines allow advertisers to set a limit on the daily expenditure related to an ad and once
the advertising expenditure goes above this amount, the search engines stop displaying this ad.
Keeping these assumptions in mind , the multi-period bidding problem can be stated as follows
max
{b¯t}
T∑
t=1
r(µ¯t, b¯t) s.t.
∑
k
µk,tck(bk,t) ≤ D, t = 1, . . . , T
where µ¯t = (µ1,t, . . . µK,t)
T is a vector of the expected number of impressions and b¯t is a vec-
tor of bids for each keyword in period t. The current period profit is computed using the for-
mula in Equation (1). For the sake of exposition, we define the ad spend in time periods t as
C(µ¯t, b¯t) =
∑
k µk,tck(bk,t). We formulate a finite horizon dynamic program with T periods to
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solve this problem.
V (1, µ¯t) = max{b¯t}
T∑
t=1
r(µ¯t, b¯t) s.t. C(µ¯t, b¯t) ≤ D, t = 1, . . . , T,
= max
b¯1 s.t. C(µ¯1,b¯1)≤D
{
r(µ¯1, b¯1) +
(
max
{b¯t s.t. C(µ¯t,b¯t)≤D}
T∑
t=2
r(µ¯t, b¯t)
)}
,
= max
b¯1 s.t. C(µ¯1,b¯1)≤D
{
r(µ¯1, b¯1) + V (2, µ¯2)
}
,
where V (t, µ¯t) is the value function at time t. More generally, the Bellman equation for this problem
is as follows
V (t, µ¯t) = max
b¯t s.t. C(µ¯t,b¯t)≤D
{
r(µ¯t, b¯t) + V (t+ 1, µ¯t+1)
}
.
µ¯, the vectors of mean impressions, constitute the state-space and the bids, b¯, are the control
variable. The state evolves in a manner shown earlier in Equation (24). As this is a finite horizon
problem, we use backward induction to solve for the optimal bids. At t = T , the advertiser
does not care about awareness and the optimal policy in the last stage is to bid according to the
policy outlined in Proposition 3. In order to find the optimal bids for t < T , we use approximate
dynamic programming. Lets assume that the expected number of generic clicks at time t are
CLK = {0, 1, . . . ,M}. For every CLK ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,M}, we evaluate the subsequent state and
optimal revenues in period t + 1. We now solve the problem in Equation (1) with the additional
constraint that there are exactly CLK generic clicks in period t. The optimal policy in this period
is to choose a CLK (and the associated bids, b¯t) that maximize the sum of current reward and the
optimal future rewards. For the field experiment, one time period spans an entire week and there
are T = 4 time periods in total. The optimal bids computed for every period are as follows
[Optimal Bids]
[Results of this forward looking policy]
6.3 Comparison of the Myopic and Forward-Looking Policies
In this section we compare the model with independent keywords with the model that subsumes
the effect of awareness. We observe that....[Analysis]
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7 Discussions
8 Conclusions
The presence of a large portfolio of keywords, multiple slots for each keyword and significant
uncertainty in the decision environment make an advertiser’s problem of bidding in sponsored search
a challenging optimization problem. In this paper, we formulated the advertiser’s decision problem
and analytically derived the optimality condition. Our bid optimization model addresses a major
gap in prior work related to incorporating multiple slots per item and the uncertainty in competitor
bidding behavior and consumer query and click behavior. We illustrated the technique using a real-
world dataset. A field test suggests that the approach can substantially boost advertisers’ RoI.
[Write about the awareness effect, trade-off between generic and branded keywords.
Discuss parameter estimates. Discuss comparison of the two methods.]
There are a number of interesting avenues along which our work can be extended. We discuss
these below.
Exploration and Learning : Our analysis assumes that keyword-specific parameters are known or
can be easily estimated based on recent historical data. If there has been sufficient bid exploration
in the recent history, these parameters can be estimated as demonstrated in our empirical study.
However new keywords and keywords for which bids have settled down into a relatively narrow
range present a challenge. Thus an important area of opportunity to further extend our work is to
combine optimization with a suitable exploration technique. Exploration is clearly expensive but
facilitates more accurate estimation of parameters. Heuristics proposed for Multi-armed Bandit and
budget constrained Multi-armed Bandit problems are particularly relevant for balancing exploration
and exploitation.
Modeling Advertiser Heterogeneity : The key assumption we make in this paper is that competitor
bids are drawn from the same distribution. This allows us to keep the model tractable and solve the
complex stochastic optimization problem faced by an advertiser but ignores heterogeneity among
competitors. Modeling heterogeneity among advertisers and strategic play is an important next
step for our research. Additionally, our focus in this paper, like that of the stream of work on
optimal bidding, is the operational bid determination problem faced by an advertiser at any given
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instant rather than an economic analysis of the long-term equilibrium that results from the bidding
strategies of advertisers in a market. Equilibrium analysis is another interesting direction, albeit a
complex one in this setting due to the presence of multiple keywords and a budget constraint.
Appendix A1: Proofs
Solution of Equation (1)
The constrained optimization problem is as follows
max
{bk}
E
[∑
k
Sk∑
s=1
v
(s)
k
]
, s.t. D − E
[∑
k
Sk∑
s=1
c
(s)
k
]
≥ 0.
The Lagrangian can be written as:
L = E
[∑
k
Sk∑
s=1
v
(s)
k
]
+ λ
{
D − E
[∑
k
Sk∑
s=1
c
(s)
k
]}
.
KKT Conditions
∀k : dL
dbk
=
d
dbk
E
[
Sk∑
s=1
v
(s)
k |bk
]
− λ d
dbk
E
[
Sk∑
s=1
c
(s)
k |bk
]
= 0
λ ≥ 0,
D − E
[∑
k
Sk∑
s=1
c
(s)
k
]
≥ 0.
Assuming the budget constraint is binding (i.e.λ > 0 ), then there exists an extremum s.t.
∀k : d
dbk
E
[
Sk∑
s=1
v
(s)
k |bk
]
= λ
d
dbk
E
[
Sk∑
s=1
c
(s)
k |bk
]
As rank
(
d(D−E
[∑
k
∑Sk
s=1 c
(s)
k
]
)
db
)
> 0, there exists at least one local maxima, and it maximizes the
objective function if it is unique.
Assuming v
(s)
k , c
(s)
k are i.i.d., the optimality condition reduces to
E[Sk]
dE[vk|bk]
dbk
= λE[Sk]
dE[ck|bk]
dbk
,
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or
dE[vk|bk]
dbk
= λ
dE[ck|bk]
dbk
.
Proof of Lemma 1
The probability that the bid of the next advertiser is less than x for some x < b conditional on the
bid b and the position i is equal to the probability that exactly i advertisers bid more than b and
exactly N − i advertisers bid less than x divided by the probability that the position is i. That is,
F (b = x|b, pos = i)
= Pr {b < x|b, pos = i} ,
=
Pr {b < x, pos = i|b}
Pr {pos = i|b} ,
=
 N
i
 (1− F (b))i F (x)N−i
 N
i
 (1− F (b))i F (b)N−i
,
=
F (x)N−i
F (b)N−i
.
Proof of Lemma 2
F (b = x|b, δ = 1)
= Pr {b < x|b, δ = 1} ,
=
N∑
i=0
Pr {b < x|b, δ = 1, pos = i} ×
Pr {pos = i|b, δ = 1} ,
=
N∑
i=0
F (x|b, pos = i)×
Pr {δ = 1|b, pos = i}Pr {pos = i|b}
Pr {δ = 1|b} ,
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=N∑
i=0
(
F (x)
F (b)
)N−i
×
α
γi
 N
i
 (1− F (b))i F (b)N−i
αγ−N (1 + (γ − 1)F (b))N ,
=
N∑
i=0
 N
i
 (γF (x))N−i (1− F (b))i
(1 + (γ − 1)F (b))N ,
=
(1− F (b) + γF (x))N
(1 + (γ − 1)F (b))N .
Proof of Proposition 2
E [c|b] = E [δb|b] ,
= Pr {δ = 1|b}E [b|b, δ = 1] ,
= αγ−N [1 + (γ − 1)F (b)]N
ˆ b
0
bd
(
1− F (b) + γF (b)
1 + (γ − 1)F (b)
)N
,
= αγ−N
ˆ b
0
bd[1− F (b) + γF (b)]N ,
= αγ−N
(
b[1 + (γ − 1)F (b)]N −
ˆ b
0
[1− F (b) + γF (b)]Ndb
)
. (Integrating by parts)
Proof of Equation 13
dE[c|b]
db
= αγ−N
(
[1 + (γ − 1)F (b)]N +N(γ − 1)bf(b)[1 + (γ − 1)F (b)]N−1
−[1− F (b) + γF (b)]N .1 +Nf(b)
ˆ b
0
[1− F (b) + γF (x)]N−1dx
)
,
= αNγ−Nf(b)
(
(γ − 1)b[1 + (γ − 1)F (b)]N−1 +
ˆ b
0
[1− F (b) + γF (x)]N−1dx
)
.
Proof of Proposition 4
Let hN (b) =
´ b
0 [1− F (b) + γF (x)]Ndx, gN (b) = [1 + (γ − 1)F (b)]N and Ψ(b) = b+ hN−1(b)/((γ −
1)gN−1(b)). If Ψ(b) is monotonically increasing then there is a unique b∗ that satisfies the optimality
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Figure 2: hN (b)/gN (b) v/s b assuming the competitors bids are Weibull(λ = 1.59, θ = 1.37, γ =
1.42). The ratio hN (b)/gN (b) decreases as N increases.
condition (Equation 14).
Ψ(b) = b+
hN−1(b)
(γ − 1)gN−1(b)
Ψ′(b) = 1 +
h′N−1(b)
(γ − 1)gN−1(b) −
hN−1(b)g′N−1(b)
(γ − 1)g2N−1(b)
,
=
gN−1(b)[(γ − 1)gN−1(b) + h′N−1(b)]− hN−1(b)g′N−1(b)
(γ − 1)g2N−1(b)
.
Ψ′(b) > 0 if gN−1(b)[(γ − 1)gN−1(b) + h′N−1(b)]− hN−1(b)g′N−1(b) > 0, or
γ[1 + (γ − 1)F (b)] > (N − 1)f(b)×[
(γ − 1)
´ b
0 [1− F (b) + γF (x)]N−1dx
[1 + (γ − 1)F (b)]N−1 +
´ b
0 [1− F (b) + γF (x)]N−2dx
[1 + (γ − 1)F (b)]N−2
]
,
= (N − 1)f(b)
[
(γ − 1)hN−1(b)
gN−1(b)
+
hN−2(b)
gN−2(b)
]
.
We can show that the ratio hN (b)/gN (b) is decreasing in N implying hN−2(b)/gN−2(b) ≥
hN−1(b)/gN−1(b) for all N ≥ 2. This intuition is illustrated in Figure (2) for a sample distri-
bution. It can be seen that hN (b)/gN (b) decreases as N is increased.
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This implies that Ψ′(b) > 0 if (write substituting )
γ[1 + (γ − 1)F (b)] > γf(b)(N − 1)hN−2(b)
gN−2(b)
,
or γ > 1 +
1
F (b)
[
f(b)(N − 1)hN−2(b)
gN−2(b)
− 1
]
If the rate of decay of the ctr with respect to position (γ) is high enough, then there exists a
unique b∗ that satisfies the optimality condition. For some common distributions like the Weibull,
Gamma and Log-Normal we numerically find that Ψ(b) is always increasing in b and there exists a
unique bid for every keyword k that satisfies the optimality condition. This is illustrated in Figure
(3) for some sample parameters.
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Figure 3: Ψ(b) for various distributions.
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Appendix A2: GMM estimation in the presence of three or more unique bids
As pointed out earlier, there are 4 parameters α, γ, λ and θ in this model and 3 moment conditions
per bid. Thus the system can be identified with data from just two unique bids. A typical dataset
however contains several distinct bids and the system of equations is over-identified. In order to use
all the available data, we can use a generalized method of moments (GMM) procedure to estimate
the parameters of the model.
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Table 6: Summary of notation
k Variable that indexes keywords
Sk Random variable denoting number of searches for keyword k
µk Expected number of search for keyword k (E[Sk])
(s) Superscript to denote sth search
bk Bid for keyword k
pos
(s)
k Position for keyword k in s
th search. pos
(s)
k = 0 denotes the top position.
δ
(s)
k Indicator variable for click on s
th search. Pr
{
δ
(s)
k = 1|pos(s)k = i
}
= αk
(γk)i
wk Random variable indicating value of a click
v
(s)
k Value of the s
th search (v
(s)
k = δ
(s)
k wk)
b
(s)
k The bid of the next advertiser
c
(s)
k The cost of the s
th search (c
(s)
k = δ
(s)
k b
(s)
k )
Nk Number of competitors
Fk() Distribution of bids of competitors
D Advertiser’s budget
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